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Abstract—Advances in quantum computing make Shor’s algo-
rithm for factorising numbers ever more tractable. This threatens
the security of any cryptographic system which often relies on
the difficulty of factorisation. It also threatens methods based
on discrete logarithms, such as with the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange method. For a cryptographic system to remain secure
against a quantum adversary, we need to build methods based
on a hard mathematical problem, which are not susceptible to
Shor’s algorithm and which create Post Quantum Cryptography
(PQC). While high-powered computing devices may be able to
run these new methods, we need to investigate how well these
methods run on limited powered devices. This paper outlines an
evaluation framework for PQC within constrained devices, and
contributes to the area by providing benchmarks of the front-
running algorithms on a popular single-board low-power device.
Index Terms—Post Quantum Cryptography, cryptography,
IoT, R-PI
I. INTRODUCTION
Public key (asymmetric) encryption methods are fundamen-
tal to the security of many digital systems. While symmetric
methods, such as AES and ChaCha20, provide confidentiality,
it is public key methods which often provide digital signing
and key negotiation. The three most widely used methods
are RSA, Elliptic Curve and ElGamal. RSA is based on the
difficulty of factorizing large prime numbers within a finite
field, while ElGamal’s difficulty involves the reversing of a
logarithm. For Elliptic Curve we have the difficulty of revers-
ing the addition of points within an elliptic curve function
bounded over a finite field. With key exchange methods, we
typically now use Elliptic Curve techniques to perform the
creation of a shared key, such as with Elliptic Curve Diffie
Hellman (ECDH). Peter Shor, though, defined a quantum
algorithm for integer factorization that runs in polynomial time
[1]. On the advent of quantum computers, most of the existing
public key methods will be cracked within a reasonable time
limits [2]. There are several methods defined for quantum
robust cryptography including:
• Lattice-based cryptography. This classification shows
great potential and is leading to new cryptography meth-
ods, such as for fully homomorphic encryption, and code
obfuscation. One of the most popular methods is Ring-
Learning With Errors (R-LWE).
• Code-based cryptography. This classification was cre-
ated in 1978 with the McEliece cryptosystem [3] but
has barely been using in real applications. The McEliece
method uses linear codes that are used in error correct-
ing codes, and involves matrix-vector multiplication. An
example of a linear code is Hamming code.
• Multivariate polynomial cryptography. This classi-
fication involves the difficulty of solving systems of
multivariate polynomials over finite fields. Unfortunately,
many of the methods that have been proposed have
already been broken [2].
• Hash-based signatures. This classification involves cre-
ating digital signatures using hashing methods. The draw-
back is that a signer needs to keep a track of all of
the messages that have been signed, and that there is a
limit to the number of signatures that can be produced.
New methods, though, integrate into Merkle Trees, which
allows for the signer to use the same keys to sign multiple
entities.
This paper focuses on the coverage of the important meth-
ods that could be used within PQC, and in their evaluation
around the TLS handshaking process. It includes measure-
ments of 17 key exchange methods and nine signature meth-
ods. The benchmarking tests are performed within the ARMv8
64-bit architecture (aarch64), specifically a Raspberry Pi 3B+
running openSUSE, and the the open source C-library liboqs
was used to provide statistically meaningful (n > 30) samples
for seven key encapsulation and five signature schemes. Since
we used the test functions built into liboqs, these results lend
themselves to repeatability.
A. Foundation Notions for Measuring Security
[4] permutes two separate properties which a crypto-system
might possess, with three separate scenarios of attack. They
take these pre-existing notions and examine their relationships.
The first property is Indistinguishability (IND). This holds
where an adversary, given ciphertext c, is unable to learn
anything about the associated plaintext p. The second is Non-
Malleability (NM). This holds where an adversary, given a
ciphertext c, is not able to produce a separate ciphertext c′ such
that the plaintext p′—that c′ enciphers—is some legitimate
variant of p.
The three attacks are as follows. The adversary in each
case is going to be given a challenge ciphertext which they
need to decipher. Under a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA), to
help them, the adversary has access to the encrypt function,
and so can generate as many ciphertexts from plaintexts as
they wish. For the Non-Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
(CCA1), the adversary also has the ability to decrypt as many
ciphertexts as they wish, up until they are sent the one for the
challenge. Finally, for the Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
(CCA2), the adversary has all the previous capabilities, and
can also keep querying the decrypt function after the challenge
has been received, except for the very challenge ciphertext
itself. Figure 1 shows the implications that [4] proves to hold
between the six permutations of property and type of attack.
This figure highlights two things. First, that IND-CCA2 and
NM-CPA

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Fig. 1. Implications of IND, NM and CPA, CCA1, CCA2
NM-CCA2 are equivalent, which is to say that in the context of
the Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack, Non-Malleability and
Indistinguishability amount to the same. Second, that IND-
CPA is the weakest of the notions that might apply to a
cryptosystem. Informally, this is the idea that the content of an
encrypted message stays hidden from a passive eavesdropper,
who has access to the public key and the encrypted message.
1) Signature Strength: Signature schemes can also be clas-
sified according to whether they are susceptible to various
types of forgery. [5] introduced three notions of forgeability;
Universal, Selective and Existential. Informally, the notions are
as follows. A signature scheme is Universally forgeable if the
adversary can sign any message with a signature that appears
genuine. If the adversary can do this for a particular message
that they select, then the scheme is Selectively forgeable.
Existential forgeability applies where the adversary can forge
a signature for at least one message; but they have no control
over the content of the message itself.
Similar to the notions for encryption schemes, above, there
are different types of attack scenario to be considered. Under
a Known-message attack, the adversary has access to a set
of messages and their signatures. Under a Chosen-message
attack, she is allowed to choose a list of messages which will
be signed and returned to her.
The strongest types of signature schemes will not allow
even Existential forgery under the most severe attack; Chosen-
message. This feature is called Existential Unforgeability
under Chosen Message Attack, and is commonly abbreviated
as either ‘EU-CMA’, or ‘EUF-CMA’.
B. Security Level
One measure of the strength of a cipher is to conjecture
how many operations an attacker would need to perform in
order to break it. If they would need to perform 2n operations
in order to break the cipher, by brute force, the cipher is said
to have a security level of n-bits. For a symmetric cipher such
as AES, this is the size of the key. I.e. AES-128 offers 128-
bit security, meaning an attacker would need to perform 2128
operations to break it.
There is a quantum algorithm ([6]) which reduces the time
of a brute force attack on such keys which means that the post-
quantum security is lower than the classical one ([7]). There
is a well-known birthday paradox which means the security
level for n-bit hash-functions is typically n/2 ([8]). In the
context of a hash function the security level is the number of
operations, on average, that one needs to perform to generate
a collision. [9] uses this with Grover’s algorithm to make hash
functions even more vulnerable against a quantum adversary;
the security level is a third of the length of the output of the
function.
In order to illustrate this, table I (adapted from [10], with
additions) combines these results to show some cryptographic
schemes and their classical and post-quantum security levels.
C. The Hardness of Mathematical Problems
Here we give an informal introduction to the notion of NP-
hardness from complexity theory. First we need to introduce
asymptotic notation. We occasionally use some asymptotic
notation, which denotes the order of growth of functions ([11,
16]). For any two positive functions, f(x) nd g(x):
• f = O(g) means there are two constants, m and n such
that f(x) ≤ m · g(x) for all x ≥ n. Intuitively: f grows
no faster than g.
• f = Ω(g) means g = O(f). Intuitively: g grows no faster
than f .
• f = Θ(g) means f = O(g) and g = O(f). Intuitively:
f and g grow at the same rate.
Turing machines were the invention of Alan Turing. They
are theoretical models which simulate computation. The head
of the machine moves over a tape which is split into squares.
What state the machine is in together with what it scans from
the square are listed in a finite table which dictates what it does
next ([12]). Deterministic Turing machines move from one
state to another deterministically; i.e. given the situation there
is a single well-defined path to take. For a non-deterministic
Turing machine, there may be move than one route to follow
([13]).
Solving a problem in polynomial time means that the
amount of time taken to solve it is not greater than a poly-
nomial in the size of the input to the algorithm. I.e. for a
size of input n, the time t(n) = O(nc), for some constant c
([14]). We can now introduce the two classes, P and NP , as
follows ([11, 15–16]). If a deterministic Turing machine can
solve the problem in polynomial time, then that problem is in
the class P . If a non-deterministic Turing machine can solve
the problem in polynomial time, then that problem is in the
class NP .
NP contains the whole of P , but it is not known whether
P and NP are co-extensive. Many people believe that P 6=
NP ; if that is correct then there are problems which cannot
be solved in deterministic polynomial time. Such problems
would be good candidates for using as a basis in cryptographic
systems.
We should note two things. First, the lack of a proof that
a problem is NP -hard does not show that it is not. However,
it should engender caution about assuming that it is. Second,
that the complexity of a problem may be such that even though
Key or Output Classical Post-Quantum
Algorithm Type Size (bits) Security (bits) Security (bits)
RSA-1024 Public Key 1024 80 0
RSA-2048 Public Key 2048 112 0
ECC-256 Public Key 256 128 0
ECC-384 Public Key 384 256 0
AES-128 Symmetric 128 128 64
AES-256 Symmetric 256 256 128
SHA-256 Hash 256 128 85
SHA-512 Hash 512 256 170
TABLE I
CLASSICAL AND POST-QUANTUM SECURITY LEVELS
it is soluble in deterministic time, it would take an unfeasible
amount of time. What is feasible will change as technology
improves.
A proof of security might be based solely on the hardness
of the task involved in breaking a cryptographic scheme. If
such a proof exists, the scheme is said to be secure in the
standard model.
A weaker notion is to invoke an idealisation and prove
the scheme is secure based on that idealisation. Where the
idealisation involved is a black box random oracle, the scheme
is said to be secure in the Random Oracle Model. This is
introduced by [15]. The working assumption is that where a
scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model (ROM),
then the scheme where the random oracle is replaced by a hash
function, is also secure. The authors point out that this is not a
proof that the hash-based scheme is secure, but rather that the
‘protocol is secure to the extent that h instantiates a random
oracle’ [15, 14].
The driving thought is that proof of security in the ROM
acts as a guide—or heuristic—for the scheme being secure in
reality. There is some dispute about whether this methodology
is sound ([16]). Loosely, one can concoct a scheme which
is provably secure in the ROM, but demonstrably insecure.
However, following [17], it seems that used with appropriate
caution, the paradigm does provide some assurance regarding
the security of a scheme.
[18] introduces the idea of the quantum random oracle
model (QROM). In this case the oracle is allowed to be
in a quantum superposition when it is queried. In that case
measuring the input to find out what it is will alter the
state itself. The assumptions on which proofs of security in
the ROM rely may well break when faced with this added
complication. Being secure in the ROM and being secure in
the QROM are therefore distinct.
In so far as the ROM methodology does provide a good
heuristic for a security proof for a scheme, we should prefer
ones that are secure in the QROM.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section outlines the core principles behind some of the
key quantum-robust encryption methods.
A. Hash-Based
A cryptographic hash function, H , is a one-way function
which takes a variable size of input data and produces a
fixed size output ([19]). It is called ‘one-way’ since it has
the following properties.
• Pre-image Resistance: It is computationally very hard to
find, for a given hash value x, a value a such that H(a) =
x.
• Second pre-image Resistance: It is computationally very
hard to find, for a given data input a a separate input, b,
such that H(a) = H(b).
• Collision Resistance: It is computationally very hard to
find different a and b, such that H(a) = H(b).
Cryptographic hashes have many uses. The first we shall
look at, due to Lamport ([20]), is to enable digital signatures.
The purpose of a digital signature is to allow a recipient of
a message to verify two things. First, that the message does
indeed come from the stated sender, and second that it has not
been tampered with en route.
Lamport’s Signature Scheme involves the sender creating
a pair of private and public keys. The private key is used
to produce the signature for the message. Lamport’s scheme
operates bit-by-bit; the secret key is two separate lists of
random bits. If the nth bit of the message (Mn) is 0, then
the nth bit of the signature (Sn) is taken from the first list; if
Mn is 1, then the second list is used.
The recipient uses the same hash function on the signature
to check against the public key, which is also made up of
two lists, and is the hash value of the secret key. Taking the
Mn, the receiver works out the hash value of Sn. If Mn is 0,
this hash value is compared against the first list of the public
signature; if Mn is 1, then against the second list. If all the
hashed bits match against the public key, then the signature is
valid. Since the hash was produced with a key which is private
to the sender, the sender has also been verified.
There are two main disadvantages of Lamport’s scheme.
The first is that the keys are relatively big; to encrypt in 256-bit
blocks, one needs a 256-bit key. More importantly, to remain
secure, each key can only be used once. If the same key is
used more than once, and this is known, then an eavesdropper
can start to produce their own forged signatures which appear
genuine. The main drawback to Lamport’s scheme is that it
is single-use. To overcome this, a sender would need to use a
different key pair for every message. To do this with a brute
list would be costly; which is why Merkle ([21]) introduced
the idea of a hash tree, also known as a Merkle Tree. There
are many variants ([22]), but the key notion is to induce a
data structure which is hierarchical and uses a hash function
to generate its nodes. This is the second usage of hashes; this
is an outline of how the process works ([23]):
• The sender generates all the public and private keys that
they need, using the Lamport scheme.
• They then construct a Merkle Tree with one public key
at each node. The tree can be identified by the hash value
at its root. This root hash value is the public key for the
whole system of private/public key pairs in play.
• The sender picks a private key to sign the message.
(Which one will be discussed below.)
• The sender creates a Merkle Proof. This proof shows
that the corresponding public key is in the Merkle Tree
identified by the hash value at its root.
• The sender sends the message, the signature, the Lamport
public key which corresponds to the private key, and the
Merkle Proof.
• The receiver first uses the Merkle Proof to check that the
public key provided is in the Merkle Tree identified by
the hash value at its root.
• With that assurance they can verify the signature using
the public key provided.
It is essential that the same private/public key pair is not used
twice. One way to ensure this is the case is to use the key pairs
in sequence and keep track of where we are in the sequence;
it is stateful. The main innovation here is the Merkle Tree
and associated Merkle Proof. Since the Merkle Tree can be
identified by the hash value at its root, it can act as the public
key of the entire system of private/public key pairs. It is much
shorter than using the list of the individual public keys. The
security of this system relies solely on the security of the hash
function that is used ([22]). This makes it a single point of
vulnerability. But in fact this is also an advantage; given the
design of the meta-structure it is relatively straightforward to
change the hash function as and when it is compromised.
What if we wanted to use a Lamport-style scheme, but
instead of signing bit-by-bit, sign variable chunks, say, of 4
bits at a time? Since there are 16 different combinations of 4
bits, we would need 16 separate lists of random numbers. This
led Winternitz to propose what is now called a Winternitz-type
one-time Signature Scheme (WOTS+) [24]. The central idea
is to start with a single list of random numbers as the seed
list. Then we generate the next list by using the hash function
on the elements of that list; this is repeated iteratively until
we have as many lists as needed. This means we only need to
store the seed list; the others can be calculated.
Winternitz’s proposal for the public key is that we take
the final secret key and apply the hash function once more.
This means that someone trying to verify a message against a
signature can apply the hash function iteratively, as many times
as appropriate (i.e. to check an item against list four, apply
the hash function the remaining 15 times) and then compare
against the equivalent in the public key. The proposal also
includes a checksum, which is signed along with the message.
The nature of the checksum is such that an attacker cannot
alter the message and then tweak the signature appropriately
([25]).
1) Signatures without a State: For the systems presented so
far, the signer must keep track of which leaves have been used;
that is: the systems are stateful. This has some drawbacks. For
instance, if a system is restored from back-up, the counter will
be reset; but the signatures are in the wild. Re-transmission
will involve re-use of one or more private keys. Goldreich
introduced the idea of a stateless system for signing ([26]). The
central notion is to make the number of available private/public
key pairs so large that it is statistical very unlikely that the
same pair would ever be used twice. Within certain parameters,
this risk can be managed. However, the signature size suffers.
SPHINCS ([27]) is a highly optimised system to reduce
the signature size, whilst maintaining a stateless hash-based
approach. It enhances an earlier few-time signature scheme
(FTS), HORS (Hash to Obtain Random Subset; [28]), to create
HORST (HORS with Trees). SPHINCS is introduced with
rigorous security credentials, which they note are lacking in
the cases of other post-quantum hopefuls ([27, 2]).
2) Zero-Knowledge Based: Schemes based on zero-
knowledge are arguably hash-based, for reasons that will
become clearer below. The challenge driving zero-knowledge
schemes is to convince someone that you know something,
such as a passphrase, without letting them know the thing
itself. That is: the only piece of knowledge that they gain is
whether you do indeed know the item in question, and nothing
else. Hence ‘zero-knowledge’. The notion was introduced in
[29]. [30] and [31] develop and explain the notion. A useful
introduction can be found in [32]. Systems based on zero-
knowledge proofs are not necessarily quantum-resistant; but
they can be.
A sigma protocol provides a methodology for such an
exchange. Suppose Alice wants to prove to Bob that she knows
some secret, without letting Bob know what that secret is.
Following [33], in outline, the protocol proceeds as follows:
• Alice sends a commitment to Bob.
• Bob chooses a challenge at random, concerning the
commitment and sends it to Alice.
• From the challenge, Alice computes a response and
returns it to Bob.
• Based on the response, Bob either accepts or rejects
Alice’s original claim.
Where this is implemented as four algorithms; Commit, Chal-
lenge, Respond, Check, the flow can be seen in Table II (from
[17]).
Sigma protocols have three important properties: Soundness
- if Alice tries to cheat Bob, Bob will find out; Completeness-
if Alice is telling the truth, then Bob will be convinced; and
Zero-knowledge - Bob does not learn anything else, other than
the binary fact of whether Alice’s original claim is true or false.
To prove the zero-knowledge of a protocol, [29] proposes
the following method. Suppose there is an algorithm Simulator
(Simon), which starts with no special knowledge whatsoever.
Suppose further that Simon is able to trick Bob into believing
a statement is true, whilst producing a pattern of steps which
Alice Bob
co, st = Commit(secret, public)
co
−−−−−−−→
c = Challenge()
c
←−−−−−−−
r = Respond(st, c)
r
−−−−−−→
Check(co, c, r)
TABLE II
OUTLINE SIGMA PROTOCOL
cannot be distinguished from that produced by Alice. This
appears to contradict Soundness. However, the conditions
under which we can construct Simon’s responses are idealised.
To be more precise, they involve being able to rewind the
steps taken in the protocol. That is, Simon can adjust his
response to the challenge, after having seen what the challenge
will be. This could not happen in practice, between a real
Alice and Bob. The core idea, then, is that if for every
possible Verifier (Bob), we can show the existence, under these
idealised circumstances, of a Simulator (Simon), then there is
no knowledge to be transferred and hence the protocol is zero-
knowledge.
Sigma protocols are not automatically zero-knowledge; they
are in fact honest-verifier zero-knowledge. This is a weaker
condition that applies when the Verifier (Bob) is acting hon-
estly. However, a sigma protocol can be turned into a zero-
knowledge scheme by making it non-interactive. The idea of a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof was introduced in [34].
The driving thought here is that the Alice and Bob may not
be available concurrently to execute the protocol. There is a
well-known transformation called the Fiat-Shamir transform
from [35] which takes an interactive scheme a makes it non-
interactive. Briefly put, instead of Bob generating a challenge,
Alice chooses a hash function (H) and creates the challenge
herself, as outlined in Table III (also from [17]).
Alice Bob
co, st = Commit(secret, public)
c = H(public, co)
r = Respond(st, c)
co, r
−−−−−−−−→
c = H(public, co)
Check(co, c, r)
TABLE III
FIAT-SHAMIR TRANSFORMED SIGMA PROTOCOL
Before introducing the scheme, we briefly explain the
import of Unruh’s transform ([36]). In the context of zero-
knowledge proofs, the input of a classical random oracle
is well-defined [36, 758]. This allows for the ‘rewinding’
involved in the idealised thought experiment to produce a sim-
ulator. This assumption does not hold in the quantum random
oracle model (QROM). Unruh works within the QROM and
provides a transform parallel to the Fiat-Shamir transform but
for quantum states where the input to the oracle may be in
superposition.
With the above notions in place, we can introduce Picnic,
which is a Microsoft-led project (Picnic project), described in
[37]. The central motif is to take a system of zero-knowledge
proofs for statements about boolean circuits ([38]). The set of
inputs to a circuit is the secret key. The precise configuration
of the circuit is hard to invert; i.e. it constitutes a trapdoor
function. The output of the circuit makes up the public key.
At the heart, is a zero-knowledge proof system for boolean
circuits, ZKBoo, as put forward in [39]. This is optimised
to produce ZKB++. The Unruh transformation is applied to
ZKB++, creating a non-interactive zero-knowledge scheme
which is provably secure in the QROM ([37, 2]). The authors
employ the LowMC block cipher ([40]) for the hash function.
The resulting signature scheme is dubbed Picnic.
B. Code-Based
Around the same time that Lamport was producing his
scheme for digital signatures, McEliece was applying the
theory of error-correcting codes in telecommunications to the
same purpose. The McEliece scheme was published over 40
years ago in [3]. It has withstood many years of cryptanalysis
and the original remains secure and quantum-resistant.
1) Goppa-McEliece: The McEliece scheme is an asym-
metric public/private key system based on a type of error-
correcting codes, known as Goppa codes after [41]. The public
key is a generator matrix of a Goppa code, which is carefully
chosen to be indistinguishable from a random matrix. Because
of the nature of the key, it is very large. To introduce the
scheme, we need to introduce some relevant concepts, taken
from [42] and [43].
• Linear Code. A binary linear code C of dimension k and
length n ≥ k is a k-dimensional subspace of the vector
space {0, 1}n. A codeword is a vector in C.
• Goppa Code. A Goppa code is a particular type of linear
code, defined in [41].
• Hamming Weight. The weight of a codeword is the
number of its co-ordinates that are non-zero.
• Generator Matrix. The rows of the Generator Matrix
form a basis of a linear code C. It is a k × n matrix
G ∈ {0, 1}k×n, such that C = {xG|x ∈ {0, 1}k}.
The mapping x 7→ xG takes a k-bit word to an n-bit
codeword.
• Permutation Matrix. A permutation matrix is binary, in
that it contains only ones and zeros. Each row/column
pair contains only zeros, apart from a single position
which is a 1.
There are three parameters for a McEliece system, which
are shared amongst its users, n, k and t. n is the length of the
Goppa codes; k is the dimension of the Goppa codes and t
is the number of errors for introduction (by the sender) and
correction (by the recipient). To generate the keys (following
[44]):
• Choose C: a random [n, k, 2t + 1]-linear code over F2,
with efficient decoding algorithm D which can correct
up to t errors.
• Compute G: a k × n generator matrix for C.
• Generate S: a random k × k binary non-singular matrix.
• Generate P : a random n× n permutation matrix.
• The public key is (G′, t), where G′ = SGP .
• The private key is (G,S, P,D).
For plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}k, Alice takes Bob’s public key
(G′, t) and picks a random vector e ∈ {0, 1}n of weight t,
and computes the ciphertext:
c = mG′ + e
Receiving the ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}n, Bob consults his
private key (G,S, P,D), and calculates:
cP−1 = (mS)G+ eP−1
Bob notes that (mS)G is a valid codeword for the linear code,
and eP−1 has a Hamming weight of t, so using the decoding
algorithm D, he reaches the interim step:
c′ = D(cP−1) = mS
and from there recovers the message
m = c′S−1
As noted in [44], McEliece’s original scheme uses irre-
ducible binary Goppa codes. [45] presented an efficient algo-
rithm for decoding these, known as the Patterson algorithm.
To use this algorithm we need the polynomial which is used
for generating the Goppa code. We can then finesse the private
key as (G,S, P, g(X)), where g(X) is the Goppa polynomial
for the chosen code.
[46] proposes a very similar system to McEliece. The
McEliece and Niederreiter schemes were shown to be equiv-
alent in [47]. It is the derivative system that was used to
construct a digital signature scheme in [48]. Whilst it does
have short signatures, [22] criticises it for still having very
large keys. The Niederreiter scheme is also the basis of the
McBits implementation of [49].
2) Quasicyclic Codes and MDPC: [50] proposed a restric-
tion to the use of block-circulant matrices for the generator
matrix. A circulant matrix is one where each row is rotated
right from the previous row ([42]). With this restriction in
place, only the first row is necessary to identify the matrix
involved. Hence the public keys can be substantially smaller
than those in the traditional McEliece system. Furthermore,
[51] proved that this does not alter the security proof in its
essentials. However, [52] introduced an algebraic technique
that shows that some instances of this compact-key approach
can be broken in negligible time.
A separate attempt to reduce the size of the keys was
put forward by [53]. The proposal here is to use Moderate
Density Parity Check Codes (MDPC). This could provide for
more efficient key-exchange ([42]), with smaller keys than the
original McEliece system.
C. Multivariate Quadratic Polynomials
The basis of the multivariate public key cryptosystem is
the multivariate quadratic polynomial (MQ) problem. The
public key is a system of quadratic polynomials of the form
(following [54] and [55]):
pi(x1, . . . , xn) = αi +
∑
1≤j≤n
βijxj +
∑
1≤j≤k≤n
γijkxjxk
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and the coefficients αi, βij , γijk ∈ F, where F
is a small finite field. Then the public key can be written
P(x) = (p1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , pm(x1, . . . , xn))
or simply P for short. The private key, denoted P ′, is a map
P ′ : Fn → Fm
This is the map in the centre of the scheme. To disguise this
central map, it is combined with two other maps, which are
invertible S : Fm → Fm and T : Fn → Fn. The private key is
(S,P ′, T ). The public key is the composite map P = S◦P ′◦T .
Figure 2 from [55] shows a useful way of visualising the make-
up of this trapdoor system.
Input x

x = (x1, . . . , xn)
Private: S

ED
BC
Public:
P = (p1, . . . , pn)
oo
x′
Private: P ′

y′
Private: T

Output y
Fig. 2. MQ-Trapdoor
In order to encrypt plaintext x ∈ Fn, generate the ciphertext
y = P(x); y ∈ Fm. In order that the decryption produces a
unique output, this relation needs to be injective, hence it needs
to be the case that m ≥ n ([56]). To decrypt a ciphertext y ∈
F
m, first compute y′ = T−1(y) ∈ Fm, then x′ = P ′−1(y′) ∈
F
n, and finally x = S−1(x′) ∈ Fn.
A signature scheme requires that the mapping is surjective,
so that any document can be signed. Hence in this case,m ≤ n
([56]). The signing process reverses the steps for encryption.
Take a message, m. First we compute a hash value using a
secure hash function H(·): h = H(m) ∈ Fm. We then use
the inverted maps in sequence: y′ = T−1(h) ∈ Fm; x′ =
P ′−1(y′) ∈ Fn to reach the signature s = S−1(x′) ∈ Fn.
To check whether a message m has a valid signature s, we
generate the hash value of the message h = H(m) ∈ Fm.
Then we use the public key to compute h′ = P(s). As long
as h and h′ match, then the signature is authentic.
1) The MQ-Problem: The security of this type of system
depends on how hard the MQ-problem is. Namely the dif-
ficulty, given P , of discovering its components S ◦ P ′ ◦ T .
Alternatively, for each quadratic in P , being the series
pi = (x1, . . . , xn)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, solve the system
p1(x¯) = p2(x¯) = pm(x¯) = 0
This problem is, in general, hard ([57, 194]).
2) Oil and Vinegar: The Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
(UOV) scheme is presented in [58], which built on the original
Oil and Vinegar scheme of [59], after the latter was broken
in [60] Let F be a finite field and o and v integers. Define
n = o + v, V = {1, . . . , v} and O = {v + 1, . . . , n}.
x1, . . . , xv , and xv+1, . . . , xn are the vinegar and oil variables,
respectively. Then the private key P ′ is made up of quadratics
of the form:
pi = α
′
i+
∑
j∈V ∪O
β′ijx
′
i+
∑
j∈V
∑
k∈O
γ′ijkx
′
ix
′
j+
∑
j∈V
∑
k∈V
δ′ijkx
′
jx
′
k
where 1 ≤ i ≤ o, and the coefficients (α′i, β
′
ij , γ
′
ijk, δ
′
ijk) are
randomly chosen from F.
To produce the public key only one map T is used: P =
P ′ ◦ T . The private key is then (P ′, T ).
3) Other Schemes: These include:
• Rainbow Rainbow was introduced in [61], and can be
considered a nested version of UOV. It results in a very
fast signature scheme ([56, 32]).
• Hidden Field Equations (HFE) [62] introduces HFE. The
original was broken, and extended in [63] to HFEv-, with
the implementation QUARTZ. These modifiers indicate
the two-fold aim to take some equations from the public
key (HFE-) and add further vinegar variables (HFEv).
• Gui. Gui is another HFEv- scheme from [64]. This can
get down to 120-bit signatures, providing 80-bit security
([56, 33].
• Multivariate Quadratic Digital Signature Scheme
(MQDSS). MQDSS from [7] has a security proof that
depends only on the hardness of the MQ-problem. Two
other MQ-based signature schemes include PFLASH
([65]) and Tame Transfer Signatures (TTS) ([66]).
• SimpleMatrix. Lastly, there is an encryption scheme, as
opposed to signature scheme, proposed by [67], called
SimpleMatrix.
D. Lattice-Based
Point lattices are mathematical structures from Minkowski’s
geometry of numbers ([68]). In this context, they are of interest
since some lattice problems are provably hard. [69] introduces
a lattice as a system of parallel lines, and subsequently a
point lattice as the points of intersection of those lines. This
paper follows the same path and begin by considering the
lines. However, we shall follow the cryptographic literature,
and from here on, by ‘lattice’ we shall mean ‘point lattice’.
The cryptographic exposition here draws mainly on [70], [71]
and [72].
O
Q
R
P
b1
b2
Fig. 3. A Point Lattice
Figure 3 shows a lattice in two dimensions, from [69, 32, ff]
(using an adapted [73]). The parallelogram OPQR acts as a
template, and determines the shape of the overall lattice, which
extends in both dimensions to infinity. Equivalently, the lattice
is generated by the two vectors
−−→
OP and
−−→
OQ, labelled b1 and
b2 in the diagram. This is a basis of the lattice, which can be
written in this case as B = {b1,b2}. For this introduction, we
restrict our attention to integer lattices; i.e. all the co-ordinates
are integers. Then we can generalise to n-dimensional lattices
(compare [69, 523, ff]):
B = {b1, . . . ,bn}
The lattice L is then the sum of the integers with these vectors:
L = L(B) =
n∑
i=1
(Z · bi)
The basis of a lattice is not unique. In this example, as well as
{
−−→
OP,
−−→
OQ}, the same lattice could be described by {
−−→
OP,
−−→
OR}
or {
−−→
OQ,
−−→
OR}.
1) The Shortest Vector Problem: There are several mathe-
matical problems for lattices which are considered hard. The
first is the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). The minimum
distance (λ1) in a lattice is the shortest nonzero vector:
λ1(L) = min
v∈L\{0}
‖v‖
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean distance. The challenge of SVP
comes in several varieties. The Search version is to find a
shortest nonzero vector in a lattice L, given a basis B of that
lattice, such that ‖v‖ = λ1(L). The related Decision version
(GapSVP) is given a basis, B, of lattice L, and a real d > 0,
discover whether λ1(L) ≤ d or λ1(L) > d.
There are also versions of these problems which introduce
an approximation factor (γ ≥ 1) to allow less precise answers
to the question. Given a basis, B, of lattice L, and a real d > 0,
discover whether λ1(L) ≤ d or λ1(L) > γ · d.
There are proofs that SVP is NP-hard (e.g. [11, 83 ff]).
However, Peikert points out that most crypto-systems rely on
the approximations such as GapSVPγ , which are not proven
to be hard. They may still be hard enough, since solutions
to these approximation problems appear to require 2Ω(n) time
([71]).
2) Short Integer Solution: The seminal work [74] intro-
duced the problem of the Short Integer Solution (SIS). This
is then proven to link to the GapSVP problem just outlined.
The problem involves n-dimensional integer vectors, modulo
q: Znq . Starting with a set of these vectors, that are uniformly
random, a1, . . . , am, the aim is to find a set of nontrivial
z1, . . . , zm where zi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, such that:
m∑
i=1
ai · zi = 0 ∈ Z
n
q
The vectors a1, . . . , am can be combined into a matrix A ∈
Z
n×m
q , and the problem can be restated in terms of the lattice
which it generates:
L⊥(A) = {z ∈ Zm : Az = 0}
The SIS problem then is to find a suitably short vector in
A. One notable contribution of [74] is as follows. Consider a
short vector; meaning its distance is less than a parameter β,
which itself is very much less than the modulus q. Suppose
you have a reliable method for finding such a nonzero vector
z ∈ L⊥(A). Ajtai proves that in that case, you also have a
reliable method for solving GapSVPβ
√
n. Therefore, SIS has
been shown to be hard on the assumption that GapSVPγ is
itself hard.
3) Learning With Errors (LWE): Learning With Errors was
introduced in [75]. The main parameters are the dimension (n),
the modulus (q) and an error distribution (χ). n and q are as
for SIS; χ is usually a Gaussian distribution. Associated with
the distribution there is also the width of the error sample,
which is much less than q and the rate, α which is the width
divided by q.
In the Search version of the problem, start with a secret
s ∈ Znq . The set-up is that an attacker will be given as
many samples as they wish for (m). The ith sample consists
of ai, being a vector chosen uniformly at random from Z
n
q .
Then bi = 〈s, ai〉 + ei mod q, where ei is drawn from the
distribution χ
As for SIS, the series ai can be listed as a matrix, and the bi
and ei as vectors b and e respectively. Then, where t denotes
the transform operation, then we have:
b
t = stA+ et (mod q)
Also following the case for SIS, this can be expressed in terms
of a lattice. The Search problem then becomes for
L(A) = {Ats : s ∈ Znq }+ qZ
m
the vector b of the samples is uniquely close to one vector. The
Decision version of LWE is to tell the difference between a
set of responses (A,b) and a set (A,b′), where b disguises
a secret, but b′ is simply uniformly random. This has been
shown to be at least as hard as the Search-LWE problem.
4) LWE Cryptosystem: Here we follow [75] to describe a
cryptosystem based on LWE. The security parameter is n; the
LWE dimension. Three other parameters are the number of
samples m, the modulus q and a distribution χ over Z.
The private key is the secret s ∈ Znq which is chosen
uniformly at random. The public key is the set of samples
as laid out in the previous section. We choose m vectors
a1, . . . am at random from Z
n
q . We also choose error factors
e1, . . .em, from Zq according to the distribution χ. Then
the public key is the list for 1 ≤ i ≤ m of (ai, bi) where
bi = 〈ai, s〉+ ei.
To encrypt a bit, choose a random subset S from the list of
samples (ai, bi) which make up the public key. If the bit is 0,
the encryption is:
(
∑
i∈S
ai,
∑
i∈S
bi).
If the bit is 1, the encryption is
(
∑
i∈S
ai, ⌊
q
2
⌋+
∑
i∈S
bi)
where ⌊x⌋ is a rounding function, denoting the largest integer
which is not greater than x. To decrypt a pair (a, b), first
calculate b − 〈a, s〉. If that value is closer to 0 than to ⌊ q2⌋
modulo q, then the decryption is 0. Otherwise the decryption
is 1.
5) Further Developments: Lattices have proven an ex-
tremely fertile area for cryptography. [70] provides a detailed
survey of the progress up to three years ago. This is a non-
exhaustive list which demonstrates the how diverse the field
is. [76] presents a signature scheme that relies on SIS. A
collision-resistant hash-function based on SIS is in [77]. For
n-dimension LWE, the public key is n2 bits and the ciphertext
is n bits; that is to encipher a plaintext of a single bit. Despite
this, [78] presents a key exchange protocol, Frodo, based on
LWE.
Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) was introduced in [79]
RLWE is a special case of LWE for polynomial rings over
finite fields. The main advantage over LWE is that RLWE has
smaller keys. RLWE works over a ring R, degree n, over Z. A
modulus q ∈ N defines a quotient ring. Based on RLWE, [80]
introduced the key exchange mechanism NewHope. The key
exchange system BCNS ([81]) is also based on RLWE. There
are also signature schemes, such as GLYPH put forward by
[82].
Nth degree Truncated Polynomial Ring (NTRU) [83] was
the first cryptosystem to use polynomial rings, in the system
labelled NTRU ([70, 14]). The public key size is approxi-
mately the same size as for RLWE, but with a smaller private
key. There were initial concerns about the lack of a security
proof. However, subsequent advances have shown that it can
be made secure, based on the hardness of RLWE ([84]). There
is a signature scheme, NSS, which is based on NTRU in
[85]. There is also a signature scheme called Bimodal Lattice
Signature Scheme (BLISS) described in [86].
E. Isogeny-Based
An elliptic curve is an equation of the form (drawing on
[69], [87] and [19])
E : y2 = x3 +Ax +B
Loosely, an isogeny is a structure-preserving map from one
curve to another. More formally, a morphism is a rational map
between two curves, which is defined for every point. Take
E1 and E2 as elliptic curves defined over a field k. Then an
isogeny φ : E1 → E2 is a surjective (onto) morphism that
creates a group homomorphism from E1(k¯) to E2(k¯). Where
an isogeny exists, the curves involved are said to be isogenous.
The underlying mathematical problem here is given two
curves, how does one construct an isogeny between them?
Using elliptic curves, a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange can
be set up as follows.
First, select q, a large integer which is either prime or a
power of 2. This is applied as a modulus to both sides of
the general equation for an elliptic curve. It is an important
measure of the encryption for elliptic curve cryptography;
similar in that regard to the key length of other systems.
y2 mod q = (x3 + ax+ b) mod q
Then select the parameters a and b; with those in place, there is
now a set of points which makes up the elliptic curve:Eq(a, b).
The order of a point on an elliptic curve is the lowest positive
integer n, such that nG = O, where O is the zero point of the
elliptic curve. To complete the public information, we select
a point G from Eq(a, b), whose order is very large.
With these in place, the key exchange between Alice and
Bob proceeds like this:
• Alice selects a private na where na < n. She calculates
her public key Pa as na ×G.
• Bob selects a private nb where nb < n. He calculates his
public key Pb as nb ×G.
• Alice and Bob swap their public keys.
• Alice calculates the secret key K as na × Pb.
• Bob calculates the secret key K as nb × Pa.
This works since:
K = na × Pb = na × (nb ×G) = nb × (na ×G) = nb × Pa
The cryptographic security of this key exchange relies on an
eavesdropper needing to compute (e.g.) na from the publicly
available information: G and na × G. This is taken to be
mathematically hard.
1) Further Variations: [88] presented the idea of using
elliptic curves for a DH-type key exchange. However, later
work ([89]) showed that this would be susceptible to a
quantum algorithm in sub-exponential time. This led [90] (an
expanded version of which was published in [91]) to propose
a system built on supersingular elliptic curves. Supersingular
elliptic curves are a special type of elliptic curve, where the
ring of the endomorphisms is not commutative.
[92] has further built on this work to provide a set of
algorithms with a faster implementation. Recent work in [93]
has improved further on that.
III. METHODOLOGY
A competition is underway to find suitable post quantum
ciphers for the future, run by NIST. This chapter begins with
an introduction to this selection process. We then cover liboqs,
a useful tool for testing PQC, which is supported by the Open
Quantum Safe project. Some of the tests we run are on the TLS
1.3 protocol. We briefly sketch the transactions involved in that
protocol. The chapter ends with a specification of the hardware
and software which are used to run the tests themselves.
NIST has played a leading role in evaluating PQC
([94][95]), and the candidates for digital signatures must be
provably EUF-CMA up to 264 queries. For public key and key
exchange, there are two types. Where key re-use is allowed
they must be IND-CCA2, up to 264 queries. Where there is
no key re-use, IND-CPA is sufficient. As we have seen, both
AES with larger keys, and SHA with larger hash (e.g. 256
bits) are both quantum-resistant. Therefore NIST set the target
security levels for the candidates in terms of AES and SHA,
as outline in table IV. This also explains why the focus is on
key exchange rather than general encryption; the search is for
a candidate for exchanging a key of (for instance) AES which
is long enough to be quantum-resistant.
Security Level Equivalent
1 Key search on AES-128
2 Collision search on SHA256
3 Key search on AES-192
4 Collision search on SHA384
5 Key search on AES-256
TABLE IV
NIST SECURITY LEVELS
69 algorithms were accepted in the first round [96], at 21
December 2017. This was whittled down to 26 algorithms for
the second round [97], on 30 January 2019. A summary of
the second round can be found in [98], from May 2019. [95]
underlines that during the second round, performance will play
more of a role. They specifically request more benchmarking.
One area of interest is the low-power, single-board devices,
such as one finds in the Internet of Things. The broad aim
here is to run benchmarks for the second round NIST post-
quantum algorithms on a constrained device. Whilst the area
has not been ignored completely, relatively few studies have
focused on it.
A. Open Quantum Safe Project
The Open Quantum Safe project (OQS,
https://openquantumsafe.org/) is an open source project aimed
at making it easier to test new post-quantum algorithms ([99]).
Part of that provision is a C-library liboqs which is available
from Github (https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs).
The library has some post-quantum algorithms in place. There
is also a fork which integrates the library with OpenSSL
(https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/openssl).
1) Coverage: The stated aim of the OQS project team is
to provide implementations of every algorithm in the NIST
round 2 competition. Tables V and VI show which ones are
in the latest master branch of liboqs, at the time of writing.
Each cipher comes with parameter sets, which vary according
to the NIST security level that is intended.
2) OQS Benchmarks: liboqs has built-in benchmarking
functions for both key encapsulation and signatures. For
each cipher, these perform key operations for a set interval
(default 3 s) and then provide the arithmetic mean and standard
deviation for the time and the CPU clock cycles. For key
encapsulation, generating a keypair, encapsulating and decap-
sulating are measured. For signatures, key generating, signing
and verifying are provided.
This default method provides a quick way of providing good
insight, which is a benefit when testing on slower systems.
However, there is the risk that if the operation being measured
takes longer than 0.1 s then the sample size will be small, since
in this statistical context ‘small’ means n < 30 ([100, 49]).
To mitigate this, after an initial run, each set of results is
examined. If necessary, the test is then re-run with a suitable
interval to ensure n ≥ 30. This makes the arithmetic mean of
the samples more reliable.
A simple bespoke parser is used to normalise the plaintext
output of the standard liboqs benchmarking functions before
the data are charted.
B. TLS 1.3
The key encapsulation and signature schemes come together
in the TLS protocol. To see how, we briefly outline the latest
version, 1.3.
1) Protocol Outline: When a client initiates a connection to
a server, there are three main things that they wish to establish.
First how are they to continue to communicate in secret; which
cipher are they going use? Second, what is the secret to be
used? Third, is the server who it claims to be? Table VII shows
the outline of the TLS 1.3 handshake. (The specification is
[101]; the brief outline here draws from [19, 565-6], [102],
[103] and [104].)
The target is to swap a key, in secret, for an efficient and
quantum secure symmetric block cipher such as AES. The rest
of the communication then proceeds with that. The options for
which cipher are to be used are sent in the ClientHello; the
server’s choice comes back in ServerHello. The Key Exchange
mechanism ensures that both client and server have the same
key. The Authentication stage is where the client assures itself
that the server is who it claims to be.
One feature of TLS 1.3 is that it uses a HMAC-based
key derivation function (HKDF) to generate the keys from
seeds. For TLS 1.3 we need the cipher, together with the
hash function, the key exchange mechanism, and the signature
scheme for authentication. RSA-based key exchanges were
removed from TLS 1.3 due to security concerns. The danger
is that where encrypted traffic has been stored, a successful
attempt to break the RSA scheme used, in the future, would
allow that traffic to be decrypted. For key exchange this leaves
Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman, which for
added safety are re-computed for each session. For authenti-
cation, both RSA and elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) are permitted. The components are packaged as
authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD), such
as ‘TLS AES 256 GCM SHA384’.
2) TLS Benchmarks: There is a branch of the OpenSSL
project into which liboqs has been integrated. This allows
us to measure the time for a TLS handshake, as follows.
Two constrained devices are linked on a simple network. One
acts as a server (openssl s server), the other as the client
(openssl s client). For a given set of parameters, the client
establishes a connection to the server, and then terminates.
This is performed 50 times in a row, and measured with the
‘perf’ command, yielding a good approximation of the mean
time to perform the TLS handshake.
There are two dimensions under investigation. One is the
impact of using different cipher suites to sign and verify the
certificates. For this, the key exchange mechanism is held
constant. The other is the impact of varying the ciphersuite
used to perform the key exchange. For this, the signing
cipher is held constant. Each key exchange mechanism from
liboqs examined above is represented. However, at the time of
writing, only Dilithium and qTESLA are available for use as
signature schemes.
The relevant data from the output of perf are stripped out
and normalised using simple bespoke scripts before being
presented.
C. The PQC/IoT Laboratory
1) Hardware: The hardware in the laboratory is as follows.
• The constrained devices are the Raspberry Pi 3B+ with a
1.2GHz quad core ARMv8 (A53) 64 bit processor, 1GB
RAM and 32GB storage.
• Where needed, a simple standalone network is cre-
ated using a home-based router (TPLink TD-W9970)
as a switch. The wired network LAN provision is 4 x
10/100Mbit s−1.
• Access to the devices is over SSH from a laptop.
• The desktop machine for compiling aarch64 code is an
iMac with 3GHz Intel i5, with 6 cores.
2) Software:
• In order to save time, a cross-compiler for ARMv8 is built
and run on a more powerful desktop machine, running
macOS 10.14.5. The cross-compiler (crosstool-ng) is built
with gcc 8.3.0. The aarch64 code is also compiled with
gcc 8.3.0.
• liboqs and OpenSSL with liboqs, are compiled for the
ARMv8 (aarch64).
• liboqs requires a 64 bit operating system. The default
operating system for a Raspberry Pi is Raspbian, which is
currently 32 bit only. We choose OpenSUSE (Leap 15.0,
Underlying Variant Protocol In liboqs?
Lattice
LWE
Crystals-Kyber 
FrodoKEM 
LAC ×
Saber 
Three Bears ×
RLWE
NewHope 
Round5 ×
NTRU
NTRU 
Prime NTRU ×
Code-Based
Goppa
Classic McEliece ×
NTS-KEM ×
Moderate Density Parity-Check BIKE 
Hamming Quasi-Cyclic HQC ×
Low Density Parity-Check LEDACrypt ×
Low Rank Parity Check Rollo ×
Ideal and Gabidulin RQC ×
Isogeny Supersingular SIKE 
TABLE V
NIST ROUND 2: KEY EXCHANGE BY TYPE
Underlying Variant Protocol In liboqs?
Lattice
LWE Crystals-Dilithium 
RLWE qTESLA 
NTRU Falcon ×
Hash-based
Stateless SPHINCS+ 
Zero-Knowledge Picnic 
Multivariate
UOV
LUOV ×
Rainbow 
HFEv- GeMSS ×
Pure MQ MQDSS 
TABLE VI
NIST ROUND 2: SIGNATURE BY TYPE
JeOS) since it appears to be the best maintained of the
64 bit Linux-based systems for the ARMv8 available.
IV. RESULTS
In this paper we present our results and compare them,
where possible, with other benchmarks from the literature.
First we look at the key exchange mechanisms. That is
followed by the results for the signature schemes. We then
look at the TLS handshake which combines both exchange
mechanisms and signatures. Finally, we offer some considera-
tions which aim to help with choosing a reliable cryptographic
algorithm.
A. Key Exchange Mechanisms
To gain an appreciation for the different systems, we chart
the public and private key sizes in table VIII. These are
gleaned from the second round submissions for: Crystals-
Kyber ([105]), FrodoKEM ([106]), SABER ([107]), NewHope
([108]), NTRU ([109]), BIKE ([110]) and SIKE ([111]).
In order that the numbers are not overwhelming, we restrict
the view in several ways. First, we choose the parameter set
which has been provided for achieving level three security,
which is equivalent to breaking AES-256, or alternatively 128
bits of quantum security. Second, where IND-CPA and IND-
CCA versions are specified, we restrict the view to IND-
CCA. Third, we pick the first BIKE model as representative
of that family of three implementations. Lastly, we only list
those which currently have a representation in liboqs. These
restrictions overlook many subtleties, but nevertheless yield
insight.
With respect to speed, the candidates fall into three divi-
sions, with lattice-based solutions being the front-runners. In
the first division are Saber, Kyber and NewHope. Saber has
both a reasonable keysize and is performing its operations
sub-millisecond. The second division is made up of Frodo,
NTRU and code-based BIKE. Finally, SIKE is in a division
of its own; whilst having a reasonable keysize, it is taking
over 3 full seconds for encapsulating or decapsulating. These
divisions are compared in figures 4, 5 and 6.
1) Comparison with Other Work: Table IX shows the
results from three other papers to measure the key exchange for
post quantum algorithms. The listed speed is the speed of an
encapsulation followed by a decapsulation. The table presents
the best attempt to provide like-for-like comparison between
the various works. The main point is that the benchmarking is
conducted under differing assumptions. This means that com-
parisons between the results need to be made with very great
care. A brief outline of the works illustrates the differences.
Seo et al [116] implements a highly optimised version
of SIKE, written in assembly for the aarch64 instruction
set, and tested on an ARMv8 (A53) running 64-bit code at
1.536GHz. For SIKEp610 (NIST level 3), the reported clock
cycles (crudely) equate to 303ms. An et al [114] measures the
performance of the protocols then available in liboqs: Frodo,
BCNS, NewHope, MSrln, Kyber, NTRU, McBits, IQC and
SIDH. The tests are on an Intel i7-5500 at 2.4GHz, two
cores, with 16GB RAM. For Kyber and Frodo they use non-
standard parameter sets for which the post quantum security
level is unclear. This is probably due to the work coming
before alterations for round two of the NIST competition.
The NTRU and SIDH parameter sets are not specified, so the
quantum security is unclear.
Malina et al [115] tests six key exchange mechanism;
NewHope, NTRU, BCNS, Frodo, McBits and SIDH. To do
this they tweaked liboqs to run in 32-bits, and then ran tests
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TABLE VII
TLS 1.3 PROTOCOL OUTLINE
Underlying Variant: Protocol Parameter Set Private Public
Lattice
LWE: Saber SABER-KEM 2,304 992
LWE: Crystals-Kyber Kyber-768 2,400 1,184
LWE: FrodoKEM FrodoKEM-976 31,296 15,632
RLWE: NewHope NewHope1024 3,680 1,824
NTRU: NTRU ntruhps4096821 1,592 1,230
Code-Based MDPC: BIKE BIKE-1-CCA 6,592 6,205
Isogeny Supersingular: SIKE SIKEp610 524 462
TABLE VIII
KEY EXCHANGE SUBMITTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE KEY LENGTH (BYTES)
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Fig. 6. KEM Meantimes: 3rd Division Algorithm at Level 3
Cipher Bench Security Level Constrained? Speed (ms)
Saber [112] —  18.84
Saber [113] 185  98.60
Saber This Work 185  1.60
Kyber [114] — × 0.38
Kyber [113] 164  93.39
Kyber This Work 164  2.40
NewHope [114] 233 × 0.23
NewHope [115] 206  2.36
NewHope [113] 233  159.61
NewHope This Work 233  3.38
NTRU [114] — × 2.06
NTRU [115] 128  12.88
NTRU [113] 128  94.69
NTRU This Work 128  32.82
Frodo [114] — × 9.38
Frodo [115] 130  702.12
Frodo This Work 150  175.30
SIKE [116] 192  303.00
SIKE [113] 192  279,866.01
SIKE This Work 192  6,620.41
TABLE IX
COMPARISON WITH OTHER KEM WORK
on (a) an Android 6 device with Qualcomm Snapdragon 801 (4
cores) at 2.5GHz with 2GB RAM, and (b) a Raspberry Pi 2,
running Raspbian Strech Lite, on an ARMv7 at 1.2GHz, with
1GB RAM. Karmakar et al [112] Implements an optimised
Saber on an ARM Cortex-M4, with an assumed clock of
168MHz.Kannwischer et all [113] from July 2019 presents
a benchmarking framework pqm4. They consistently benched
10 key encapsulation and 5 signature schemes on a 32-bit
ARM Cortex-M4 running at 24MHz, with 196kB of RAM.
Frodo-976 takes too much resource to run in this environment.
There are several other related works which are not suitable
for inclusion in Table IX, since they are even more disparate
than those included. We describe them briefly to show why.
• [117] looks at MQ-based systems on a ATxMega128a1
microprocessor, running at 32MHz, with 8 kB RAM and
128kB storage.
• [118] compares the speed of a RLWE cipher against
classical ciphers, when used for the key exchange during
TLS handshakes. Benchmarks are from an ARM Cortex-
A7 running at 700MHz with 1GB of RAM and storage
of over 1GB. They class the classical security level at
128bit.
• [119] uses the ABSOLUT ([120]) tool to test Frodo
and NewHope on simulated (a) Raspberry Pi 2, with
Broadcom BCM2836 at 900MHz quad-core 32-bit ARM
Cortex-A7 processor with 1GB RAM, and (b) Raspberry
Pi 3, with Broadcom BCM2837 at 1.2GHz quad-core 64-
bit ARM Cortex-A53, also with 1GB RAM. The focus
on power consumption, and the numbers provided do not
provide for a comparison with the current work.
• The recent [121] provides extensive observations on the
integration of post-quantum algorithms into TLS and
SSH.
B. Signatures
For the different signature schemes, we chart the public
and private key sizes together with the signature size, in table
X. These are taken from the second round submissions for:
Dilithium ([122]), qTESLA ([123]), MQDSS ([124]), Rainbow
([125]) and SPHINCS+ ([126]). As for key exchanges, we
restrict the view to those parameter sets which aim for security
at NIST level 3, and only list those which currently have a
representation in liboqs.
Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 show how they line up against
each other. There are some items which should be taken into
account with these comparisons.
a) qTESLA: There is a version of qTESLA which is
provably secure, but it is not yet implemented in liboqs and
has not been tested here.
b) SPHINCS+: SPHINCS+ presents three sets of param-
eters of various sorts. First, since it is hash-based it needs
a hash function. There are three options: Haraka, SHA256
and SHAKE256. Second, they produce a set of parameters
optimized for small signatures (‘s’ for small) and for fast
processing (‘f’ for fast). They also produce a ‘robust’ ver-
sion whose security proof relies on the security of the hash
involved, compared with ‘simple’ whose security proof is
heuristic in the sense of being proved in the ROM. For a given
NIST level, there are therefore 12 different sets of parameters.
We take SHA256 to be representative.
c) Rainbow: The ‘compressed’ version can take the
private signature down to 64 bytes (512 bits).
1) Comparison with Other Work: Table XI shows a com-
parison between the benchmarks from [113] and the results
presented here. The speed is the total speed of a sign/verify
pair.
a) [127]: Shows that an optimised SPHINCS-256 can
run on an ARM Cortex M3 running at 32MHz with 16 kB
RAM. This is a signature scheme, and no numbers are
comparable to those presented here.
b) [113]: is explained in § IV-A1, above. With respect
to signatures, Rainbow and MQDSS outstrip the available
resource.
C. TLS 1.3 Handshake
In our tests, varying the signature algorithm made no
difference to the size of the handshake (2041B read, 391B
written), nor to the (wall-clock) speed of the handshake (mean
time of 0.05 s). This may be because the two PQC signature
algorithms available, Dilithium and qTESLA, are both lattice-
based. One area for further work is to examine this area
in more detail, when further algorithms are available. The
importance of the security of the signature algorithm should
not be underestimated; it ensures the authentication of the
counterparty.
Table XII shows how the size and speed of the TLS 1.3
handshake varies with the key exchange. This shows that, as
we expect from the results above, that Saber, Crystal and
NewHope are light and fast; BIKE, Frodo and NTRU are
comparable. While the handshake for SIKE is the smallest
of all, it takes orders of magnitude longer.
1) Comparison with Other Work: Table XIII shows two
other attempts from the literature to measure post quantum
key exchange in TLS handshakes. The same caveats apply as
for the comparisons in Table IX above.
a) [81]: implements a RLWE ciphersuite in OpenSSL
(v1.0.1f) and benchmarks interactions with an Apache web-
server. The parameters they choose aim for 128-bit security,
which matches the rationale chosen here. They provide results
for retrieving a 1 byte payload, which is comparable with
completing a TLS handshake. One difference is that they
code with TLS 1.2, which is less efficient that TLS 1.3. The
largest difference is that their devices are not constrained: the
‘client’ machine is based on an Intel i5 with 4 cores running
at 2.7GHz; the ‘server’ machine is an Intel Duo with 2 cores
running at 2.33GHz.
b) [78]: benchmarks connections to a TLS-protected
webserver for Frodo, BCNS, NewHope and NTRU. These
were run on a Google Cloud VM (n1-standard-4), with 4
virtual CPUs at 2.6GHz, with 15GB of RAM. The clients
were similarly specified (n1-standard-32). The parameters
were aimed at 128 bits of security. Some testing was also
Underlying Parameter Set Private Public Signature
Lattice (LWE) Dilithium IV 96 1,760 3,366
Lattice (RLWE) qTESLA-III 2,368 3,104 2,848
MQ
MQDSS-31-64 24 64 43,728
Rainbow-IIIc 511.4 kB 710.6 kB 156
Rainbow-IIIc-cyclic 511.4 kB 206.7 kB 156
Hash-based
SPHINCS+-192s 96 48 17,064
SPHINCS+-192f 96 48 35,664
TABLE X
SIGNATURE SCHEMES: KEY AND SIGNATURE LENGTHS (BYTES)
0 5 10 15 20 25
qTESLA
III (size)
qTESLA
III (speed)
DILITHIUM
4
1.24
1.25
2.14
10.8
5.38
6.76
25.1
14.5
1.84
Time (ms)
Keypair
Sign
Verify
Fig. 7. Signature Meantimes: Lattice-based at Level 3
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Fig. 10. Signature Meantimes: SPHINCS+ SHA256 ‘s’ at Level 3
Cipher Bench Speed (ms)
Dilithium IV
[113] 485.10
This Work 0.01
qTESLA-III
[113] 354.06
This Work 2.70
SPHINCS+-SHA256-192
f-sim [113] 30,116.29
f-sim This Work 824,908.31
f-rob [113] 57,169.86
f-rob This Work 1,558,082.26
s-sim [113] 793,925.00
s-sim This Work 21,187,279.39
s-rob [113] 1,433,837.19
s-rob This Work 38,682,673.41
TABLE XI
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SIGNATURE WORK
done on a BeagleBone Black, with an AM335x ARM Cortex-
A8 running at 1GHz. The BeagleBone was not running a TLS
client, and there is no available comparison on that front with
this work.
D. Choosing an Algorithm
Which algorithm is best? There is no single good answer
to this question; it will depend on a number of factors.
The purpose of the encryption is an important consideration.
Suppose the target is to verify a system update for an IoT
device. Then the signing will be done by the system issuing
the update; assume this is not itself IoT. In that case the
SPHINCS+ suite might be a viable choice. The IoT device
only needs to verify the signature, which we have shown it
can do sub-second (at level 3). That may well be fast enough
for relatively infrequent system updates. On the other hand,
SIKE (SIKE-p610) would be inappropriate for involvement in
the key exchanges of TLS since the encapsulation followed by
decapsulation would add over six seconds to the handshake.
So whether an algorithm is ‘fast enough’ will depend on the
use to which it is being put. Similar considerations will apply
to the public/private keysize.
These factors, as well as the number of bits of security
required, need to be considered. But it is important to note
that all these fall by the wayside if the system is broken. The
chief issue when choosing an algorithm is not mathematical,
but epistemological: how certain are we that the system is
secure? We explore this by breaking it down into a series of
questions.
• Venerability. How venerable is the underlying mathemat-
ical problem? The more cryptanalysis it has survived the
better.
• NP-hard. Is there a proof of the hardness of the under-
lying problem?
• Problem-Reduction. Is there a proof of the reduction of
the scheme to the underlying problem?
• QROM-secure. Is there a proof of security in the QROM?
The existence of a proof in the QROM does not entail
reduction to the hard problem; but it is widely taken to
act as a good heuristic.
• ROM-secure. Is there a proof of security in the ROM?
The existence of such a proof does not entail security
against a classical adversary, but it is taken to be a good
heuristic. ([122, 6] conjectures that whilst the theoretical
details differ, security in the ROM and security in the
QROM will converge to indicate the same level of
security in practice.)
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that even schemes which
are proven to reduce to provably NP -hard problems might
turn out to be tractable, if it turns out that P is NP .
Table XIV summarises the current answers to these five
questions, for the algorithms investigated.
E. Summary
In terms of KEM performance, SABER is the clear winner,
executing its basic operations in under a millisecond; the
TLS handshake in under 90ms. At the other end, SIKE’s
performance makes it an unlikely choice; the empty TLS
handshake taking over 8 s. It is true that there is at least
one finely-tuned version written in assembly which performs
better. However, such fine-tuning is very expensive in terms
of initial production and ongoing maintenance. It would also
make the implementation platform-dependent.
We have introduced a set of five notions—Venerability,
NP-hardness, Problem Reduction, ROM-security and QROM
security—which should be considered when trying to pin
down how certain we are that a particular algorithm is secure
or not. Whilst lattices are proving a fertile area for crypto-
graphic systems, it is interesting to note that the systems (to
date) do not reduce to the NP-hard SVP. The factors also show
SIKE in a bad light; it is only five years old, and not proven
Handshake (Bytes) Speed
Protocol Parameter Set Read Write Total (ms)
Crystals-Kyber Kyber-768 3,897 1,543 5,440 89.82
FrodoKEM FrodoKEM-976 18,553 15,991 34,544 295.81
Saber SABER-KEM 3,897 1,351 5,248 87.69
NewHope NewHope1024 5,017 2,183 7,200 88.12
NTRU ntruhps4096821 4,039 1,589 5,628 241.34
BIKE BIKE-1-CCA 7,773 5,323 13,096 199.66
SIKE SIKEp610 3,295 821 4,116 8,580.58
TABLE XII
TLS HANDSHAKE PROFILES BY KEM
Cipher Bench Security Level Constrained? Handshake (Bytes) Speed (ms)
NewHope [78] 206 × 5,514 13.10
RLWE [81] 82 × 10,479 54.00
NewHope This Work 233  7,200 88.12
NTRU [78] 128 × 3,691 19.90
NTRU This Work 128  5,628 241.34
Frodo [78] 130 × 24,228 20.70
Frodo This Work 150  34,554 295.81
TABLE XIII
COMPARISON WITH OTHER TLS WORK
Scheme Underlying Venerability (yrs) NP-hard Problem-Reduction ROM-secure QROM-secure
Saber Lattice: LWE 14a i ×i q q
Kyber Lattice: LWE 14a i ×i r r
Frodo Lattice: LWE 14a i ×i s s
NewHope Lattice: RLWE 9b j ×j t t
NTRU Lattice: NTRU 23c k ×k u u
BIKE Code: MDPC 41d l n n ×n
SIKE Supersingular 5e × v v ×v
Dilithium Lattice: LWE 14a i ×i w w
qTESLA Lattice: RLWE 9b j ×j x x
MQDSS MQ 31f m o o ×o
Rainbow MQ: UOV 20g m ×p ×y ×y
SPHINCS+ Hash: Haraka 4h — — — —
SPHINCS+ Hash: SHA256 18h — — — —
SPHINCS+ Hash: SHAKE256 7h — — — —
TABLE XIV
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CERTAINTY ABOUT SECURITY
Notes:
a 2005 [75] is a revision of the original.
b 2010 [79].
c 1996 [74].
d 1978 [3] ([53]).
e 2014 [91].
f 1988 [128].
g 1999 [58].
h SPHINCS+ is no more secure than the hash it uses ([22, 41]). Haraka dates from
2015 [129]; SHA256 from 2001 ([130]); SHAKE256 from 2012 (see [131]). The
notions of NP-hardness, or security in ROM do not apply directly to hashes.
i SVP and variants have been proved NP-hard [11]. However, the systems rely on
approximations which have not [70], hence no Problem Reduction.
j RLWE is NP-hard [70]; however, as for (i), the systems rely on approximation
problems which have not.
k The NTRU problem is not reducible to a lattice problem [70, 14]. However, RLWE
is at least as hard as NTRU and if RLWE is hard, then NTRU can be made secure
[70, 14].
l [132]
m [133]
n [110, 60-1]
o [134]
p [125, 43]
q [107, 12-3]
r [105, 19-20]
s [106, 31-5]
t [108, 28-29]
u [109, 30]
v [111, 41-2]
w [122, 5-6]
x [123, 47-8]
y [125, 43]
NP -hard. It might yet prove to be secure, but it is unlikely to
be the system of choice for constrained devices.
There is a trade-off between the speed of the system
and uncertainty about the security of the cipher system. For
signature schemes, MQDSS presents us with good balance.
It has survived through over 30 years of cryptanalysis, and
stands on the strongest theoretical basis of all the ciphers we
have examined. In that light the 250ms operating times are
reasonable.
Cryptography is a blend of theory and practice, and post-
quantum cryptography in particular is a very fast-paced area.
We have shown that many of the contenders for standardisation
are suitable in practice for single-board ARMv8 constrained
devices.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper explores how well post-quantum cryptography
performs on constrained devices. It contributes to this area
by providing benchmarks for popular single-board low-power
computers, the Raspberry Pi. We cannot rely on symmetric
ciphers to exchange cipher keys. RSA is popular at least in part
because it is (relatively) easy to understand the mathematics
behind it. The quantum-resistant alternatives are not so forgiv-
ing. Hash-based systems have built-in future-proofing. Code-
based systems are venerable and tried-and-tested. MQDSS is
a variant of multivariate quadratic polynomial ciper schemes
which is provably reducible to the underlying NP -hard math-
ematical problem. Minkowski’s lattices are a fecund area, but
the resulting systems do not reduce to the NP-hardness of the
underlying problems. Supersingular isogeny is yet to stand the
test of time.
SABER is the clear winner for the KEM with operations un-
der a millisecond and TLS handshake in under 90ms. SIKE’s
performance with the TLS handshake takes over 8 s. For a
signature scheme, MQDSS gives a good balance of theoretical
basis and reasonable run time. The issue of which ciphersuite
to trust is epistemological rather than purely mathematical.
Lattice-based systems are the fastest of many contenders that
have been shown practicable on constrained devices.
Until [113] (published late July 2019), it seemed that ours
was the first study to bring together the performance of the
front-running PQC algorithms on a constrained device for
comparison. As we have seen above, several papers run some
benchmarks on the ARM architecture, but the specifications
of the hardware involved, and the controls on the tests, are
disparate.
The leading question has been answered in this paper
by providing benchmarks on a constrained device for the
front-running algorithms in the NIST standardisation exercise
which is currently in progress. On the theoretical front, the
Literature Review includes basic introductions to the five
main areas of PQC, distinguished by their separate areas of
mathematics. The investigations together allow us to draw
several conclusions. Lattice-based systems are light and fast,
with SABER standing out as the fastest KEM. The lack of
proof of a reduction of the systems to the underlying hard
problems in lattices is of concern. BIKE rests on a sounder
theoretical foundation. For signature schemes the pattern is
similar; Dilithium is light and fast. MQDSS is slower, and
has longer signatures, but better theoretical pedigree.
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